This paper studies the e¤ect of political liberalisation on …nancial development in two steps. First, the paper examines whether political liberalisation in terms of institutional improvement promotes …nancial development, using a panel dataset of 90 developed and developing countries over 1960-99. The empirical evidence reveals a positive effect on …nancial development at least in the short-run, particularly for lower-income countries, ethnically divided countries and French legal origin countries. In the second part of the paper, a before-after event study approach is used to explore the impact of democratic transitions on …nancial development. It indicates that a democratic transformation is typically followed by an increase in …nancial development.
Introduction
A considerable increase in …nancial development during 1980-2000 has been an important economic feature in many developing countries. The average ratio of private credit to GDP increased from 23% in 1980 to 32% in 2000. The average ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP rose from 32% in 1980 to 42% in 2000. On the political front, between 1980 and 2000 there were 62 developing countries undertaking signi…cant political reforms towards democracies 1 . Do the above economic and political events in the developing world interact in important ways?
There has been relatively little work on the impact of political liberalisation on …nancial development, but much work on the correlation between political liberalisation and economic growth. The existing research in this …eld does not unanimously establish the consequences of political liberalisation for economic development. Instead, it is made up of one line of research supporting positive consequences, another line stressing negative consequences and some maintaining ambiguous views. Given the diverging arguments as to the e¤ect of democratisation, this paper aims to investigate whether political liberalisation in terms of institutional development has any impact on the speed of …nancial development. How does democratization in ‡uence …nancial development in countries with low GDP per capita, high ethnic and religious divisions or speci…c legal origins?
The importance of political liberalisation for …nancial development has been implicitly indicated by Clague et al. (1996) and Olsen (1993) . These authors argue that, in comparison to autocracies, democracies better facilitate property rights protection and contract enforcement, encouraging investment directly. The crucial role of the e¢ciency of legal and regulatory system involving property rights protection, contract enforcement and accounting practices in determining …nancial development has been emphasized by La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 and Mayer and Sussman (2001) .
The signi…cance of this study is re ‡ected in recent research on the political economy of …nancial development. Pagano and Volpin (2001) argue that self-interested policy makers may intervene in …nancial markets due to their career concerns or group interests. To some extent, the level of …nan-cial development is the outcome of speci…c political bargaining or political intervention. Rajan and Zingales (2003) 's interest groups theory of …nancial development suggests that dominant interest groups, especially incumbent …rms and incumbent …nancial intermediaries, have strong incentives to prevent new companies from entering, potentially blocking the development of a more advanced …nancial market. Beck et al. (2003) 's application of the settler mortality hypothesis by Acemoglu et al. (2001) to …nancial development suggests that the institutions established by the extractive colonizers are likely to be detrimental to …nancial development, while the institutions created by the settler colonizers tend to favour …nancial development.
Arguably, countries controlled by elite groups are more inclined to protect the interests of elite from the bulk of society, restrict participation in the political system and so on. The more power held by the elite groups, the more autocratic the system, the more obstacles for …nancial development. This tends to suggest that political liberalisation intending to limit the in ‡uence of elite group over policy making, widen su¤rage in the political system, and respect basic political rights and civil liberties could be critical for …nancial development.
To study whether political liberalisation promotes …nanical development, this research employs two methods. One is a dynamic panel data study, focusing on 90 developed and developing countries, to analyse the e¤ect of political liberalisation in terms of institutional improvement on …nancial development. The countries included are those undertaking some political reforms to improve institutional quality, but not necessarily experiencing a democratic transition over 1960-99. The bias-corrected Least Square Dummy Variable estimate proposed by Kiviet (1995) and recently developed by Bruno (2005) is the central method of this study and compared with the system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) .
The second part of this paper moves on to study probably the most important institutional change, namely political transformation from an autocratic regime to a democratic regime. It studies the e¤ect of the establishment of a representative government on …nancial development for 33 countries that underwent a democratic transformation during 1960-2000 subject to data availability for …nancial development. By using a before-and-after comparison, this exercise examines the responses of the level of …nancial development and the volatility of …nancial development after a regime transition. This paper shows that improved institutional quality is associated with increases in …nancial development at least in the short run, especially for lower income countries, ethnically divided and French legal origin countries. The before and after event study also indicates that in general democratic transitions are typically preceded by low …nancial development, but followed by a short-run boost in …nancial development and greater volatility of …nancial development. The …ndings of this research underline the in ‡uence of political liberalisation over the supply side of …nance and shed light on the strong and robust relationship between institutional quality and economic performance.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature on institutions, democratisation and …nance. Section 3 describes the measures that are used for political liberalisation and …nancial development. Section 4 analyses whether institutional improvement stimulates …nancial development. The empirical results are presented following a description of dynamic panel data methods. Section 5 turns to investigate the link between democratic transitions and …nancial development. Section 6 concludes.
Institutions, democratisation and …nance
This section brie ‡y outlines the theoretical background and motivation of this research. It discusses the role of institutions in …nancial development and the possible links between democratization and …nance.
Research on the role of institutions in …nancial development has been substantial, especially research on the e¤ects of the legal and regulatory en-vironment on the functioning of …nancial markets. A legal and regulatory system involving protection of property rights, contract enforcement and good accounting practices has been identi…ed as essential for …nancial development. Most prominently, La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 have argued that the origins of the legal code substantially in ‡uence the treatment of creditors and shareholders, and the e¢ciency of contract enforcement. They document that countries with a legal code like Common Law tend to protect private property owners, while countries with a legal code like Civil Law tend to care more about the rights of state and less about the rights of the masses. Countries with French legal origins are said to have comparatively ine¢cient contract enforcement and more corruption, and less well-developed …nancial systems, while countries with British legal origins enjoy higher levels of …nancial development. Among others, Mayer and Sussman (2001) emphasize that regulations concerning information disclosure, accounting standards, permissible practices of banks, and deposit insurance do appear to have material e¤ects on …nancial development. Beck et al. (2003) 's application of the settler mortality hypothesis due to Acemoglu et al. (2001) to …nancial development is another signi…cant work in this context. They argue that the extractive colonizers associated with an inhospitable environment aim to establish institutions that privilege the small elite group and potentially ignore private property rights, while the settler colonizers in more favorable environments are more likely to create institutions that support private property and balance the power of the state. Accordingly, institutions in the extractive environment tend to block …nancial development, while those in setter colonies are more conducive to …nancial development. Both the legal origin theory of La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 and Beck et al. (2003) 's application are related to colonisation, but the former is more concerned with how colonisation is re ‡ected in national approaches over property rights and …nancial development, whereas the latter provides a mechanism for how colonisation in ‡uences …nancial development through institutional development, and contributes to the political economy literature from a historical point of view.
The recently developed "new political economy" approach regards "regulation and its enforcement as a result of the balance of power between social and economic constituencies" (Pagano and Volpin, 2001 ). It centres on self-interested policy makers who can intervene in …nancial markets either through overall regulation or individual cases for purposes such as career concerns and the promotion of group interests. Rajan and Zingales (2003) emphasize the role of interest groups, the incumbent industrial …rms and the domestic …nancial sector, on …nancial development. They argue that incumbents have strong incentives to block the development of a more transparent and competitive …nancial sector, although these incentives may be weakened by openness to external trade and international ‡ows of capital.
It seems that political liberalisation intending to remove institutional obstacles and enhance institutional e¢ciency is bene…cial to economic development. However, much research undertaken to study the e¤ect of political liberalisation on economic performance is associated with substantial controversies. Some argue that the democratic process enhances fundamental civil liberties, stable politics and an open society; promotes property rights protection and contract enforcement; discourages corruption and lawlessness, and fosters economic growth (Olsen, 1993; Clague et al., 1996; Minier, 1998; Persson, 2005) . On the contrary, under pressures from di¤erent interest groups democratic structures may su¤er from ine¢ciency in decision-making and di¢culty in implementing viable policies for rapid growth. "Premature" democracy in developing countries possibly lowers the economic growth rate, and even results in economic disorder, political instability and ethnic con ‡ict (Persson and Tabellini, 1992; and Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000) . Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) show that "the overall e¤ect of democracy on economic growth is moderately negative" -an increase in human capital accumulation is o¤set by a decrease in physical capital accumulation in the process of democratisation.
The possible links between political liberalisation and …nancial development have been implicitly studied in the above works, especially Olsen (1993) and Clague et al. (1996) . However, research directly exploring the impact of political liberalisation on …nancial development has been lacking. This research might contribute to our understanding of the structural determinants of …nanical development. Looking at this issue is also signi…cant for examining whether political liberalisation contributes to an improved investment climate. This is because commonly-used …nancial development indicators such as the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and the ratio of credit issued to the private sector to GDP are generally forward-looking -better …nancial development is then an early indication of a better investment environment.
3 The measures and data
The sample
This research studies the impact of political liberalisation on …nancial development in two steps. The …rst-stage study uses a panel of 90 non-transition economies over the period 1960-99 with 5 observations per country. Averaging data over non-overlapping, eight-year periods enables us to abstract from business cycle in ‡uences and to examine both short-run and long-run e¤ects. The sample for this analysis excludes countries that become democracies and independent following the end of the Cold War, mainly the East European countries 2 . The selection of countries is based on the Polity index, "polity2" of the PolityIV Database. To pick up any e¤ect of institutional improvement on …nancial development, this exercise tries to incorporate all democratic reform episodes in the sense that any increase of the annual "polity2" score for a country will be considered even if it always remains an autocratic regime or a democratic regime over the whole period.
The second-stage study is undertaken by using a before-and-after event study approach on 33 democratizing countries, over the period . Following the conventional procedure, a country is treated as a democracy at any year if it has strictly positive values of the Polity indicator, "polity2", in the PolityIV database by Marshall et al. (2003) . The selection of countries hinges on not only the "polity2" in the PolityIV Database but also the "freedom" index, generated from the Freedom House Country Survey (2003) discussed below. Countries having either a "polity2" score jumping from a negative value to a positive value or a "freedom" index moving from "Not Free" to "Free" or "Partly Free" will be initially selected. The study concentrates on the countries with a democratic transformation lasting for at least 10 years.
Information on the classi…cations of income levels, region dummies, ethnic fractionaliastion, legal origins is obtained from the World Bank Global Development Network Database (GDN), 2002. The data for GDP, trade openness, and aggregate investment are from the Penn World Table 6 .1. Data for the black market premium are from the GDN.
Appendix Table 1 summarizes the description and sources of the variables involved in the empirical analysis.
The measure and data for …nancial development
The aggregate measure of …nancial development in this context is denoted by FD. Since there is no single aggregate index in the literature, we use principal components analysis to produce a new aggregate index. Ideally, the principal component analysis should be based on indicators from the banking sector, stock market and the bond market so as to capture di¤erent aspects of …nancial development. However, data on stock market and bond market development is rarely available before 1975 or even later, so the analysis focuses on …nancial intermediary development.
The measure is based on three widely-used indicators of …nancial intermediary development as follows 3 : 1. Liquid Liabilities (LLY), calculated as the liquid liabilities of banks and non-bank …nancial intermediaries (currency plus demand and interestbearing liabilities) over GDP. It measures the size, relative to the economy, of …nancial intermediaries including three types of …nancial institutions: the central bank, deposit money banks and other …nancial institutions.
2. Private Credit (PRIVO), de…ned as the credit issued to the private sector by banks and other …nancial intermediaries divided by GDP, excluding the credit issued to government, government agencies and public enterprises, as well as the credit issued by the monetary authority and 3 The description here is mainly from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996, 1999). 8 development banks. This captures general …nancial intermediary activities provided to the private sector.
3. Commercial-Central Bank (BTOT), the ratio of commercial bank assets over the sum of commercial bank and central bank assets. It proxies the advantages of …nancial intermediaries in channelling savings to investment, monitoring …rms, exerting corporate governance and undertaking risk management relative to the central bank.
Since these indicators are used to measure the size of the banking system 
The data for political liberalisation
The …rst political liberalisation index is the Polity indicator "polity2" in the PolityIV Database (Marshall et al. 2003) , denoted by POLIT. It proxies the degree of democracy and seeks to measure institutional quality based on the freedom of su¤rage, operational constraints and balances on executives, and respect for other basic political rights and civil liberties. It is called the "combined polity score", de…ned as the democracy score minus the autocracy score. The democracy and autocracy scores are derived from six authority characteristics (regulation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment; operational independence of chief executive or executive constraints; and regulation and competition of participation). Based on these criteria, each country is assigned a democracy score and an autocracy score ranging from 0 to 10. The larger is the democracy score, the fairer is the election of executive power, the more open is the political process and the higher the extent of the constraints on executive power. On the contrary, a larger autocracy score re ‡ects a less open political process in a country in terms of less competitiveness and fairness in election, narrower participation and fewer contraints on execution.
The second index of political liberalisation is the average of political rights and civil liberties from the Freedom House Country Survey (2003), denoted by "freedom" index. This survey assigns an annual score of political rights and an annual score of civil liberties to each country or territory on a scale of 1 to 7 with lower values indicating a higher level of protection. The average of political rights and civil liberties scores stands for the overall freedom value for a country. The countries with an average score less than 2.5 are considered as "Free", those with average score 2.5-5.5 are "Partly Free", and those having scores greater than 5.5 are treated as "Not Free". Since this dataset only covers the period 1972-2003, it is not used for the panel data study, but used for selecting the democratic transition countries, where a country is selected if its average score falls from above 5.5 to under 4.5 without reversals for at least 10 years.
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Where y it is the dependent variable FD, x it is the explanatory variable POLIT, z it is a vector of controlling variables including the logarithm of the GDP, trade openness (OPENC), aggregate investment (CI) and the black market premium (BMP). GDP is real GDP per capita. OPENC is the logarithm of the trade share, the sum of exports and imports over GDP (at current prices), divided by 100 plus one. CI is the ratio of investment to real GDP per capita (using domestic prices), divided by 100. BMP is the logarithm of the black market premium divided by 100 plus one. ± is a parameter vector, e.g. (± 1 ;..± 4 ) ; :´is an unobserved country-speci…c timeinvariant e¤ect and can be regarded as capturing the combined e¤ect of all omitted variables. Á t is the time e¤ect. v it is the transitory disturbance term. The subscripts i and t represent country and time period, respectively.
We assume that (1) the transient errors v it are serially uncorrelated; (2) x i; t and z i; t are potentially correlated with´i and endogenous 5 . To avoid the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables, lagged values of x i; t and z i; t are included in the regression equation, which allows feedbacks from the past shocks onto x i; t¡1 and z i; t¡1 where the current and future realisations of y do not a¤ect them. The assumption is inspired by Rodrik and Wacziarg (2004) who argue that "democratisations tend to follow periods of low growth rather than precede them".
When the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique is used to estimate this model, the OLS estimate of ® is inconsistent and likely to be biased upwards since the lagged values of y are positively correlated with the omitted …xed e¤ects.
The Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDV) method eliminates any omitted variables bias created by the unobserved individual e¤ect by using the within-group operator and estimates the new model below by OLS: 
x it =5 and
Since the lagged value of y is correlated with the new error term, as shown by Nickell (1981) , the LSDV estimate of ® can be badly downwards biased for small T, even as N goes to in…nity.
The Hsiao (1980, 1981) …rst-di¤erence Two Stage Least Squares estimator (2SLS) wipes out the individual e¤ects by …rst di¤erencing Equ (1) and uses the lagged value of y, x and z in t-2 as instruments for ¢y i;t¡1 ,¢x i;t¡1 and ¢z i;t¡1 in the …rst di¤erence equation below:
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Arellano and Bond (1991) and Ahn and Schmidt (1995) point out that the …rst-di¤erenced 2SLS estimator is consistent, but not asymptotically e¢cient since it does not make use of all available moment conditions, nor does it account for the di¤erenced structure of the residual disturbances (¢v it ). Arellano and Bond (1991) propose the …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator for dynamic panel data models which uses all lagged values of y, x and z as instruments for ¢y i;t¡1 ; ¢x i;t¡1 and ¢z i;t¡1 in the …rst di¤erence equation above. The …rst di¤erenced GMM estimator is consistent and asymptotically more e¢cient than the …rst-di¤erenced 2SLS estimator. Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that when the autoregressive parameter ® is close to unity or the variance of the individual e¤ects (´i) increases relative to the variance of the transient disturbances (v it ) in the standard AR(1) model, the instruments available for the …rst-di¤erenced equation are likely to be weak. The …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator employing these weak instruments has been found to su¤er from …nite sample bias. A "system GMM" estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) , and Blundell and Bond (1998) imposes a mean stationarity assumption on initial conditions 6 , which enables the lagged …rst-di¤erences of the series (y it ; x it ; z it ) dated t-1 to be used as instruments for the untransformed equations in levels. Based on the combination of …rst-di¤erence equations with suitably lagged levels as instruments, and levels equations with suitably lagged …rst-di¤erences as instruments, the system GMM estimator is expected to have much smaller …nite sample bias and greater precision in the presence of persistent data and weak instruments for …rst di¤erences.
The asymptotic properties of these estimators depend on having a large number of cross-section units, however. One of the main problems of using these estimators is that they may have poor …nite sample properties in terms of bias and imprecision. Starting from Kiviet (1995) , a bias-correction of LSDV has been developed recently for …nite samples. Kiviet (1995) derives an approach to approximating the small sample bias of the LSDV estimator and suggests that the bias approximation be evaluated at the estimates from some consistent estimates rather than the unobserved true parameter values, which makes bias correction operationally feasible. The Monte Carlo evidence from Kiviet (1995) , Judson and Owen (1999) and Bun and Kiviet (2003) suggest that the bias-corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC) is more e¢cient than LSDV, …rst-di¤erenced 2SLS, …rst-di¤erenced GMM and system GMM in terms of bias and root mean square error (RMSE) for small or moderately large samples. Bruno (2005) derives a bias approximation of various orders in dynamic unbalanced panels with a strictly exogenous selection rule 7 .
This analysis compares the OLS, LSDV, LSDVC and SYS-GMM, stand-ing for the system GMM estimator, for the whole sample and 3 subsamples. The LSDVC estimator is regarded as the preferred estimator, especially for subsamples, in which the independent variables other than the lagged dependent variable are assumed to be strictly exogenous. The initial estimator for the LSDVC could be either …rst di¤erenced GMM or SYS-GMM estimator. However, the SYS-GMM is selected since the Di¤erence Sargan test of additional moments conditions could not reject the null, and the SYS-GMM may be a more reliable estimator than the …rst-di¤erenced GMM in this context. The serial correlation tests are used to examine the null hypothesis of no …rst-order serial correlation and no second-order serial correlation respectively in residuals in …rst-di¤erences. Given the errors in levels are serially uncorrelated, we would expect to …nd signi…cant …rst-order serial correlation, but no signi…cant second-order correlation in the …rst-di¤erenced residuals. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is used to examine the overall validity of the instruments by comparing the sample moment conditions with their population analogue. The Di¤erence Sargan test, proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) , is used to test the null hypothesis that the lagged di¤erences of the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the errors in the levels equations. It is worth noting that, …rstly, the autoregressive parameter estimated by LSDVC and SYS-GMM lies in the interval de…ned by the OLS levels and LSDV estimates. Recall that, in AR(1) models, the OLS levels estimate of the autoregessive parameter is biased upwards in the presence of …xed e¤ects, and the LSDV estimate is biased downwards in a short panel. A consistent estimate of the autoregressive parameter can be expected to lie in between the OLS levels and LSDV estimates. It is a simple indication of the presence of serious …nite sample biases when particular estimates fail to fall into this interval or are very close to the bounds.
The regression results

Whole sample results
Both OLS and LSDV estimates indicate a signi…cant positive e¤ect of political liberalisation on …nancial development although they are biased in opposite directions. The LSDVC suggests weaker evidence at the 20% signi…cance level. The SYS-GMM estimate provides strong evidence that the improvement in institutional quality is associated with …nancial development, and the diagnostic tests, including the …rst-order and second-order serial correlation tests, Sargan test and Di¤erent Sargan test, are supportive. In general, the coe¢cients on the GDP level, trade openness and aggregate investment are positively signed, while the coe¢cient of the black market premium is negatively signed. The long run e¤ects in the cases of the OLS and LSDV estimates have been found to be positive and stable, however, the long run e¤ects for LSDVC and SYS-GMM are less precisely estimated.
In general, the table provides evidence that political liberalisation in terms of institutional improvement is followed by advances in …nancial development at least in the short run, which is not due to unobserved heterogeneity, or endogeneity biases.
Subsamples
One concern over the above …ndings is that these parameters may be heterogeneous across countries. A natural way to confront this problem is to investigate subsamples, which are more homogeneous. We turn to three subsamples in this section 8 : lower income countries, ethnically diverse countries and French legal origin countries. Since the cross-section dimensions of these samples are relatively small, LSDVC is expected to be more appropriate than SYS-GMM for these subsamples. Table 2 presents the results for the lower income countries, made up of low income and lower-middle income countries, covering the majority of the developing countries. We …nd strong evidence of a positive e¤ect of political liberalisation on …nancial development in the short run for every estimate. The LSDVC should be the most reliable estimate given the above discussion. Moreover, it also indicates that the e¤ect of improved institutional quality on …nancial development is sustained into the long run. Trade openness positively enters the models at the 20% signi…cance level. Table 3 shows the results for ethnically diverse countries which have a level of ethnic fractionalisation greater than the sample median. We …nd strong evidence of the positive e¤ect of political liberalization on …nancial development in the short run. The autoregressive parameter estimated by LSDVC and SYS-GMM are very close. The LSDVC estimates suggest a positive e¤ect of political liberalization on …nancial development at the 20% signi…cance level with GDP and trade openness entering signi…cantly. The SYS-GMM estimates provide much stronger evidence for this e¤ect, in which GDP and trade openness are present at the 20% signi…cance level. The long run e¤ects and approximate standard errors are in general less precisely estimated except for the case of the OLS and LSDV estimates.
The results for countries with French legal origin are reported in Table  4 . This selection is essentially inspired by the work of La Porta et al. (1998) which regards the legal origin as a main determinant of …nancial development. The experiments for British legal origin group, German legal origin group and Scandinavian legal origin group produce no evidence in favor of such a link.
Firstly it is worth noting that the autoregressive parameter estimated by SYS-GMM in the baseline model lies outside of the interval de…ned by the OLS and LSDV estimates, further implying the LSDVC may be a more reasonable estimator in this context. The LSDVC estimates typically show evidence in support of a positive e¤ect of institutional improvement on …nancial development for French legal origin countries at the 15% signi…cance level. The …nding seems to be in line with La Porta et al. (1998) which claims that the main characteristic for countries with French legal origins is that private property rights are generally neglected, while British legal origin countries care more about private property owners. The …nding supports a tentative hypothesis that democratisation in French legal origin countries tends to change the status of private property owners in the national economy, and is thus conducive to …nancial development.
In sum, the above studies on subsamples have produced consistent …nd-ings: improved institutional quality lends to greater …nancial development, at least in the short run. In the group of lower income countries, a signi…-cant long run e¤ect is also observed. In general, we …nd the black market premium has a negative e¤ect, while GDP, trade openness and aggregate investment enter positively. These …ndings are in accordance with Huang and Temple (2005) on the positive e¤ect of external trade on …nancial development and Huang (2005) who observes a positive e¤ect going from investment to …nancial development.
Democratic transition and …nancial development
The previous section focuses on the broader sense of political liberalisation in terms of institutional improvement, based on even a slight change of the Polity index, "polity2". This section studies the e¤ect of the establishment of representative government on …nancial development by applying a "beforeand-after" approach to a group of countries that underwent transformation from autocratic regimes to complete or partial democracies at some point during 1960-2001.
The sample selection in this section relies on both the "polity2" and "freedom" indices discussed earlier. Countries with either their "polity2" index increasing from negative values to positive values or their "freedom" index jumping from "Not Free" to "Partly Free" or "Free" for at least 10 years are considered for this analysis. In general, the "polity2" index and "freedom" index yield similar results on the timing of democratic transition for most cases. However, the "polity2" index excludes small population countries (less than half a million) and the "freedom" index is only available from 1972-73. For completeness, the selection of democratic transition countries combines both of them when both are available and relies on either of them otherwise.
The event identi…cation methodology of Papaioannou and Siourounis (2004) has been found useful for selecting the democratic transition countries, but the selection method in this analysis di¤ers from their method in the following ways. Firstly, for simplicity this analysis selects the sample exclusively depending on the changes from autocratic rule to democratic regimes without any further divisions, while Papaioannou and Siourounis (2004) divide democratisations into "full", "partial" and "borderline" with di¤erent thresholds in terms of either the "polity2" or the "freedom" index. Secondly, this analysis is interested in the e¤ect of a stable regime change on …nancial development. Hence, the sample only includes the countries whose regime changes last for at least 10 years.
The "before-and-after" approach compares an individual country's …-nancial development performance under autocratic and democratic regimes. To ease interpretation, the FD measure has been rescaled 9 in Table 5 . The …ve or ten years average of FD preceding democratic transition is compared with the mean of the FD during the …rst …ve or ten years under democracy for 33 countries. The 10-year average of standardised FD for the sample countries increases by 0.093 on average after the initiation of a democratic transition and more than half of the sample countries exhibit a boost in …nancial development. Looking at the …nancial development performance of each individual country, we …nd enormous heterogeneity across countries, ranging from an increase of 1.096 of a cross-country standard deviation of FD in the 10-year average of standardised FD for Thailand to a decline of 0.415 of a cross-country standard deviation of FD for Zambia. Korea and Madagascar also witnessed a drastic increase in the di¤erence of 10-year average of standardised FD, whilst Chile and Uruguay experienced a tremendous drop in FD following their democratisation. It is worth noting that the majority of countries that su¤ered from a dramatic drop in …nancial development after democratisation are Latin American countries. On the contrary, most African countries underwent a pick-up in …nancial develop-ment after their democratic transformation. The divergent performance in countries' …nancial development implies that, apart from democratisation, the level of …nancial development in each country may be a¤ected by numerous factors including macroeconomic risks and changes in the general investment climate. Table 5 also shows that the 5-year average of standardised FD postdemocratisation for 33 countries is larger by 0.015 cross-country standard deviations of FD than before their democratisation, and about two-thirds of the sample countries bene…t from this process. The mean increase is small, but there is also considerable heterogeneity. The median values of the increase in of standardised FD for both the 5-year and 10-year average are positive. On average, these results tend to suggest that the establishment of representative government is often associated with an increase in …nancial development, but the e¤ect is only sizeable for a subset of countries.
The upper chart of Figure 1 displays the cross-country median FD 10 years before and after transitions for the whole sample. The lower chart of Figure 1 plots the coe¢cients on the …xed e¤ect estimate of 20 time dummies before and after democratisation to re ‡ect the dynamic e¤ect of a sustained democratisation. The regression is estimated by OLS in which the unobserved country speci…c e¤ects, time e¤ect and controlling variables such as trade openness, GDP, aggregate investment and black market premium are included. The two …gures show that the sample countries in general experience a drop in FD prior to democratisation, which is in accordance with the view that worsened economic conditions are associated with subsequent democratisation. After democratisation, FD appears to move slightly upwards on average in 1-5 years, followed by a surge in 5-10 years. The charts vividly portray the main features of FD as well as economic performance in the process of democratisation. At the beginning of the process, democratisation may produce economic chaos, political instability, ethnic con ‡ict and poor economic performance. These negative e¤ects have been observed and emphasized by many authors. However, in about 5-10 years the positive e¤ects of democratisation appear and become pronounced. It is expected that the e¤ect will become stable in the medium run and long run. This …nding supports the conclusion that positive e¤ects of political liberalisation on FD exist at least in the short run, as identi…ed in the previous panel data study. Figure 2 describes the standard deviation of the FD growth rate before and after a stable democratisation for whole sample and subsamples. Democratisation has led to a substantial rise in FD volatility for the whole sample. Regional groups like Latin America (LAC) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries experience a higher volatility of …nancial development, but Asian countries (ASIA) do not 10 . The standard deviations of the FD growth rate in income groups, like low-income countries (INCLOW) and middle income countries (INCMID), and legal origin groups, like British legal origin countries (LEG_UK) and French legal origin countries (LEG_FR), increases after their democratic transition. An increase of FD volatility may re ‡ect the fact that the removal of institutional obstacles after democratic transition could bring about short-run investment booms, re ‡ected in a more volatile FD growth rate.
Conclusion
This research studies the impact of political liberalisation on …nancial development. It …rstly examines whether institutional improvement stimulates …nancial development using a panel of 90 economies over the period 1960-99. By comparing newly developed panel data techniques, including bias-corrected LSDV and system GMM estimators, this research shows that improved institutional quality is associated with increases in …nancial development at least in the short run, and this is particularly true for lower income countries, ethnically divided and French legal origin countries. For the lower income countries, this e¤ect is expected to persist over longer horizons.
This research further conducts a "before-and-after" approach to address whether signi…cant democratic transitions in terms of the establishment of representative government are good for …nancial development. The within country comparisons reveal the heterogeneity of countries' experiences of …nancial development, which implies that further investigation into other relevant factors should be worthwhile. The results also indicate that in general democratic transitions are typically preceded by low …nancial development, but followed by a short-run boost in …nancial development and greater volatility of …nancial development. The increase of …nancial development volatility is perhaps related to the immediate consequences of democratisation which may introduce greater openness to trade and competition, speed up growth, encourage investment and give more con…dence over the economic environment being open, free and competitive.
The …ndings of this research highlight the in ‡uence of political liberalisation on the supply side of …nancial development. They shed light on the strong and robust relationship between institutional quality and economic performance, and present further grounds for political reform.
The …ndings in the panel data study on the coexistence of the e¤ect of political liberalisation, GDP and trade openness on …nancial development are very signi…cant. Firstly, it enriches the evidence for an openness-…nance nexus. Huang and Temple (2005)'s cross-section and panel data study suggests that trade openness is very likely to boost …nancial development, for which institutional improvement could serve as one channel. The IMF (2003) indicates the possible existence of such a channel by concluding that "greater openness to trade and stronger competition are conducive to institutional improvement, and thus to growth". However, the …ndings of this research tend to suggest that there are additional channels via which more open policies exert a positive e¤ect on …nancial development. The …ndings are also consistent with Rajan and Zingales (2003)'s claim that trade openness is helpful for changing incumbents' willingness to promote …nancial development.
Secondly, it has implications for economic liberalisation and political liberalisation. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004) argue that "studying the effects of each reform (economic and political reform) individually can be misleading" and there are positive feedback e¤ects and interaction e¤ects between economic liberalisation and political liberalisation. They suggest that "causality is more likely to run from political to economic liberalisa-tion, rather than vice versa... we cannot rule out feedback e¤ects in both directions." The …ndings of this paper seem to be consistent with their …nd-ings on the interaction e¤ects in the sense that political liberalisation under an open economic environment exerts an additional boost to investment and economic growth, and thus to …nancial development. Notes: 82 countries. P-value is reported in brackets below point estimates. Year dummies included in all models. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The LSDVC estimator is the corrected LSDV estimator developed by Kiviet (1995) for finite sample bias and contructed for dynamic unbalanced panels by Bruno (2005) . The SYS-GMM results are two-step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics; the standard errors are based on the finite sample adjustment of Windmeijer (2005) . ¹ M1 and M2 are tests for null of no first-order and no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically N(0,1).
² Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for GMM estimators, asymptotically ?². Diff-Sargan tests the null of mean stationarity for the system GMM estimator.
³ LR measures the long-run effect of political liberalisation on financial development. Its standard error is approximated using the delta method. Note: The "before10" or "after10" is the average of FD standardized 10 years before or after transition. The "d10" is the difference between the two. This applies to "before5", "after5" and "d5". The FD standardised measure is the FD measure divided by cross-country standard deviation of FD in 1999.
